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Kelo and the Games People Play: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London
DEREK K. YONAI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Incentives matter. Economists have always argued that rational
individuals respond to incentives. This belief forms one of the basic
assumptions of economics: individuals maximize their utility. In a
game-theoretic framework, incentives determine what strategies the
players of the game will play to maximize their expected payoff. There-
fore, if the law changes the nature of the game, the players will choose
different courses of action than they would have otherwise. As a
result, the changes in the law may create unintended consequences.
The majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London' affects the
incentives facing real estate developers and local governments. That
opinion, written by Justice Stevens, held the taking and transfer of pri-
vate property from the owner thereof to another private entity, pursu-
ant to an integrated development plan, for the purpose of economic
development was sufficient to "satisfy the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment."
2
This article argues that the Court's holding creates an incentive
for private developers to rent-seek by asking local governments to
transfer private property to them instead of purchasing it in the private
market.3 Likewise, the Court's holding creates incentives for local gov-
ernments to take private property pursuant to their eminent domain
powers.
* Lundy Scholar of Business Philosophy and Assistant Professor of Economics,
Campbell University. B.A., University of California, Irvine; J.D., Cum Laude, Whittier
College School of Law; M.A., George Mason University; Ph.D., George Mason
University. The author would like to thank Maxwell L. Stearns and the Theoretical Law
and Economics session participants at the 2006 Western Economic Association
International Meeting for their helpful comments. All errors contained herein are
solely the responsibility of the author.
1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. Id. at 2659-60, 2665.
3. Rent-seeking occurs when an individual or a firm engages in purely wasteful
activity for the sole purpose of obtaining a wealth transfer or some other benefit.
Typically, rent-seeking is applied in cases where the government has created "artificial
or contrived rents." Robert D. Tollison, Rent-seeking, in PERSPECTIVES OF PUBLIC CHOICE
506, 508 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
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The majority opinion also noted that if states disagree with the
Court's decision, they may use a heightened level of scrutiny above
"the federal baseline."4 This article demonstrates that states may
engage in a signaling game to create a separating equilibrium between
states that wish to protect private property rights and those who do
not. As a result of this game, this article questions whether one may
see population shifts between regions and states as people vote with
their feet.5 This article finds that the result of people voting with their
feet is, at best, ambiguous or that people may move to states that do
not highly protect private property rights.
II. Kelo v. City of New London
In 2000, the City Council of New London, Connecticut, in an
attempt to revitalize the city, increase tax revenue, and increase eco-
nomic growth after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare
Center, initiated an economic development plan in the Fort Trumbull
area.6 To implement this plan, the "[Niew London Development Cor-
poration (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established some years
earlier to assist the city in planning economic development, was
reactivated."7
"In January of 1998, the State [of Connecticut] authorized a $5.35
million bond issue to support the NLDC's planning activities and a
$10 million bond issue toward the creation of a Fort Trumbull State
Park."8 One month later, "Pfizer Inc. announced that it would build a
$300 million research facility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort
Trumbull. . . ."9 Later that spring, after receiving proper city and state
authorization and approval, "the NLDC finalized an integrated devel-
opment plan focused on 90 acres of the Fort Trumbull area."1 °
The NLDC's finalized plan consisted of seven parcels of prop-
erty. " Parcel 1 consisted of a hotel with conference facilities along the
waterfront with a "small urban village."' 12 Parcel 2 was planned as an
urban residential neighborhood. 13 Parcel 3 contained "at least 90,000
4. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
5. See generally, Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64(5) J. OF
POLITICAL ECON. 416 (1956).
6. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
7. Id. at 2659.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
[Vol. 29:83
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square feet of research and development office space"; it was slated to
be "located immediately north of the Pfizer facility. '' 14 The plan
divided Parcel 4 into two sections: parcel 4A was to be either parking
or retail space while parcel 4B was to include a "renovated marina." 15
The remaining parcels (parcels 5-7) contained a mix of office, retail,
parking, and other spaces. 16 In January of 2000, the NLDC was
instructed to obtain the necessary properties to implement its develop-
ment plan. 7 It was authorized to either purchase the necessary prop-
erty or to use eminent domain to obtain the 90-acre area.'
Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina and Charles Dery, and six other prop-
erty owners refused to sell their property.19 The NLDC initiated con-
demnation proceedings in November of 2000.20 Since 1997, Susette
Kelo had lived in her home and had made several improvements to it.
2 1
Wilhelmina Dery had occupied her home since birth in 1918; her hus-
band, Charles Dery, had lived in the home since their marriage.22 The
NLDC did not declare the properties in question as blighted but rather
condemned the properties based on their geographic location within
Fort Trumbull.23 In addition, the property owners were not hold-outs
and did not oppose the economic development plan, but instead
brought suit as a matter of principle.2
4
Kelo and the other property owners filed an action in the New
London Superior Court seeking relief from the condemnation proceed-
ing.25 The trial court gave the property owners a permanent
restraining order against the NLDC for the property situated in Parcel
4A but allowed the condemnation of property in Parcel 3.26 Both par-
ties appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.27
The Connecticut Supreme Court overturned the decision of the
trial court and held that "all of [New London's] proposed takings were
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2659-60.
19. See id. at 2660.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2660.
26. Id.
27. Id.
20061
3
Yonai: Kelo and the Games People Play: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Kelo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
valid."'28 The property owners appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and it granted certiorari to determine whether the con-
demnation of the properties by the NLDC "satisfies the 'public use'
requirement of the Fifth Amendment."' 9
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens reaffirmed the long held American legal tradition
that "the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose
of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation. 3 Stevens also acknowledged that a competing legal
doctrine exists where "a State may transfer property from one private
party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the tak-
ing .... ,3' Though he provided the two competing arguments, Ste-
vens, nonetheless, claimed that "[n]either of these propositions . . .
determin[ed] the disposition of [the] case.' '32 Since the facts of Kelo
did not fit into either extreme, Stevens argued that the Court must
determine whether the taking fulfills the "public use" requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.33
However, instead of applying the "public use" test of the Fifth
Amendment, Stevens argued that proper analysis necessitated "the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public pur-
pose. ' '' 34 He noted the Court had applied this broader standard in
Fifth Amendment cases since the end of the nineteenth century.35
Thus, "the disposition of this case therefore turn[ed] on the question
whether the City's development plan serve[ed] a 'public purpose."'36
The majority opinion relied upon Berman v. Parker37 and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.38 The Berman decision held that a gov-
ernment's determination "that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled" is a legitimate public purpose.39 The Berman decision
also held that the government's development plan must be considered
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2661.
30. id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 2662.
35. Id. (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896)).
36. Id. at 2663.
37. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
38. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
39. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
[Vol. 29:83
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in its totality, and Fifth Amendment cases cannot be brought on a "lot
by lot, building by building" basis.40
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Hawaii's act was "a
naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private
property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and bene-
fit."'" In this case, the Court held Hawaii's desire to eliminate "social
and economic evils of a land oligopoly" qualified as a legitimate public
purpose.42 Given the broad interpretation of these holdings, Stevens
argued the Court's "public use jurisprudence ha[d] wisely eschewed
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
takings power.
43
Stevens argued that Berman required the plan in question to be
viewed in its entirety and "not on a piecemeal basis."44 In addition the
cases qualified a taking as meeting a public purpose in three situa-
tions: (1) where the locality has a "well balanced" redevelopment plan
(as in Berman);45 (2) where the state sought to "[break] up a land oli-
gopoly" to aid the state's real estate market (as in Midkiff); 46 and (3)
where the state sought to eliminate a "significant barrier to entry in the
* . . market" (as in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto).47
The Court argued that while New London may not have faced the
same blight as in Berman, the City was still distressed, as evidenced by
the existence of a comprehensive economic development plan.48 Given
this similarity with Berman, the Court argued the City's development
plan must be examined in its entirety instead of narrowly focusing
only on what will replace the petitioners' property. 49 Finding New
London possessed a well-deliberated and comprehensive plan, the
Court concluded "[b]ecause [the] plan unquestionably serves a public
purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment."" °
40. Id. at 35.
41. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235 (quoting Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir.
1983)).
42. Id. at 241-42.
43. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005).
44. Id. at 2665.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984)).
48. Id. at 2665.
49. See id.
50. Id.
20061
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Stevens also addressed the issue of providing private land to a pri-
vate entity via condemnation. He argued sometimes the promotion of
a public purpose meant property had to be given to private benefi-
ciaries.5 Stevens further argued precedent in Berman, Midkiff, and
Monsanto supported his position. 52 In Berman, the Court held the tak-
ing was a public use even though it was argued that it was a "taking
from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman."53 In
Midkiff, the Court held property could be taken from the original land-
owners and given to the lessees of the property.54 Finally, Monsanto
held private data could be shared to promote market competition.55
Given this foundation of precedent demonstrating that a public pur-
pose can be achieved by giving condemned property to private parties,
Stevens concluded that the facts of Kelo were no different.56 Thus, the
transfer to a private party was a non-issue for purposes of a Fifth
Amendment takings challenge.57
The majority opinion concluded the NLDC plan did not violate
the Fifth Amendment; the taking of the petitioners' property was free
of Constitutional infirmity. 58 Public purpose was thus held to encap-
sulate governmental economic development. The NLDC's plan was
not hindered by the fact that the property would be transferred to
another private party.
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy joined the majority but
noted several points of concern. First, Kennedy observed that a taking
must be rationally related to a public purpose as outlined in Midkiff.59
Kennedy reminded the Court that the value of the rational basis test
was its provision of a standard to prevent takings that are "intended to
confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only
incidental or pretextual public benefits .... "60
After noting this concern, Kennedy then applied the rational basis
test to the facts before the Court in Kelo. He concluded that the NLDC
plan was rationally related to the public purpose of economic develop-
51. Id. at 2666.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2666 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33).
54. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243-45.
55. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014.
56. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
57. Id. at 2668.
58. Id. at 2668-69.
59. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241).
60. Id.
[Vol. 29:83
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ment because an investigation by the trial court found that the main
purpose of the development plan was not designed to aid Pfizer, but
rather to aid the surrounding community by taking advantage of the
growth potential created by Pfizer's presence.61 In Kennedy's view, the
petitioners erred in their belief that Berman and Midkiff did not limit
the government's condemnation power.62 The rational basis test set
forth in Midkiff provided that limit.6 3 While Kennedy opined that
cases of economic development did not necessitate a higher standard
of review, he did acknowledge the Court's decision "[did] not foreclose
the possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . .might be
appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings.
64
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined
in Justice O'Connor's dissent.65 O'Connor argued that for the Public
Use Clause to have any substance, there must be some judicial check
on what qualifies as a public use as opposed to a private use.66 She
outlined three historical categories that qualify as legitimate public
uses. The first category is where the "sovereign may transfer private
property to public ownership". 67 The second category is where "the
sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often com-
mon carriers, who make the property available for the public's use -
such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium. ' 6' The third
category is where "in certain circumstances and to meet certain exi-
gencies, takings that serve a public purpose also satisfy the Constitu-
tion even if the property is destined for subsequent private use."69
Berman and Midkiff fall under the last category of cases.7 °O'Connor argued Kelo was a case of first impression because its
facts did not fit within the three categories of legitimate public uses.
7 1
According to O'Connor, the real question before the Court was, "[are]
economic development takings constitutional? '7 2 In answering this
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 2670.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2672.
67. Id. at 2673.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2672.
2006]
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question, O'Connor distinguished Kelo from Berman and Midkiff. She
argued Berman and Midkiff satisfied the Public Use Clause because in
"those cases, the extraordinary, pre-condemnation use of the targeted
property inflicted affirmative harm on society - in Berman through
blight resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly
resulting from extreme wealth."'7 3 The takings in those cases "w[erel
necessary to remedy the harm."74 The public purpose fulfilled in
those cases was the removal of said harm. 75 According to O'Connor,
Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's homes "[were] not a source of
any social harm.
76
O'Connor concluded, because Kelo did not fit within the excep-
tional circumstances of Berman and Midkiff and did not fit the other
legitimate categories of public use, the Court had expanded the mean-
ing of public use.7 7 She asserted that the Court had legitimized the
government's action of taking private property and giving it to another
private party for private use as long as the public tangentially benefits
from the transfer. 78 Given this broad definition, O'Connor argued that
no constraint exists on the government's eminent domain power.79
O'Connor further observed that the possible limitations on emi-
nent domain were weak at best. She pointed out the majority's test of
whether the transfer's "sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on a private
transferee" is impotent because the Court never explained how to
engage in such analysis.80 In addition, the rational basis test and pos-
sible increase of scrutiny postulated by Justice Kennedy was also weak
because Kennedy never explained the facts that would justify such
heightened scrutiny - he only knew the facts in Kelo did not qualify.81
O'Connor saw the second limitation imposed by the Court to be
that eminent domain can only be used to improve property. She
believes this makes the Public Use Clause "[alt best ... redundant with
the Due Process Clause . . ." or, at worst, "ha[ving] no realistic
import. ' She argued the effective result of the majority's opinion was
that the "specter of condemnation [would] [hang] over all property";
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 2674-75.
77. See id.
78. See id. Examples of this tangential benefit include: "increased tax revenue,
more jobs, and maybe even aesthetic pleasure." Id.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 2675.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 2676.
[Vol. 29:83
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this was necessarily so because under the majority's analysis, any
property could be condemned if anyone could argue that he or she
could put the property to a more profitable use than the landowner.8 3
In O'Connor's view, there was nothing "to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton. '8 4
O'Connor also dismissed the Court's dicta to the effect that states
could provide a higher level of protection than the Constitution if they
so desired. 5 She argued that, by passing this issue to the states, the
Court was acting irresponsibly.86 Additionally, O'Connor argued that
while the United States has a system of federalism, the states should
not have to deal with problems created by the Court's "refusal to
"187enforce . the Federal Constitution ....
D. Justice Thomas' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas' dissent was based more on jurisprudential philos-
ophy than on the precedent before the Court. 8 Thomas argued the
line of cases relied upon by the majority were unreasoned.8 9 He
argued under such circumstances, the Court should instead rely upon
the original meaning of the Constitution.90 For the purposes of this
article, a detailed discussion of Thomas' dissent is not necessary.
IlI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The Kelo decision offers an opportunity to analyze, economically,
what may result from the Court's decision. Given the discussion
above, the result of the case is a local government or private entity
(bestowed with eminent domain powers) possessing an integrated plan
may condemn private property for economic development. This stan-
dard of scrutiny is not very difficult to meet and virtually any plan that
involves economic improvement may satisfy this standard. If one takes
Justice O'Connor's dissent seriously, there is no de facto limitation on
condemnation.
Given the possible scenarios painted by O'Connor, one can
examine whether her fears are unfounded or whether private property
owners should have serious concerns about the protection of their
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2677.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2677-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2682-86.
90. See id. at 2687.
2006]
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property from real estate developers. This portion of the article exam-
ines how the Kelo decision may change the incentives faced by local
governments and real estate developers using the analytical tool of
game theory.
A. Brief Primer on Game Theory
"Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-mak-
ers."9 1 Game theory asks the question of what happens when rational,
utility-maximizing individuals or groups interact with each other.92
When setting up a game in normal form (as a matrix), three elements
must exist: the game must have "a list of participants or players" 93 ; "for
each player, a list of strategies"94; and "for each array of strategies, one
for each player, a list of payoffs that the players receive."9 This simply
means the game needs players who have choices (or moves) that earn
them particularized payoffs given what the other players of the game
choose to do.
In order to solve these games, one must find the Nash equilibrium
of the game. 96 "A Nash equilibrium is an array of strategies, one for
each player, such that no player has an incentive (in terms of improv-
ing his own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy array."97 To
find the Nash equilibrium in a normal form game, one can use a
"brute-force approach."98 This means that "for each player, and for
each feasible strategy for that player, [one must] determine the other
player's best response to that strategy." 99 Each cell of the game that
possesses the best response for all players is a Nash equilibrium.
Another game form discussed in this article is an "extensive form"
game or, more simply, a game that appears in the shape of a tree.
Extensive form games differ from normal form games because exten-
sive form games involve a timing component whereas normal form
91. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 1 (1991).
92. See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law 1 (1994).
93. DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 10 (1990).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See KREPS, supra note 93, at 28.
97. Id. A more intuitive way to think about it is that a Nash equilibrium occurs
when "each player's strategy is a best response to the other's" best response. ROBERT
GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 9 (1992).
98. GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 9.
99. Id.
[Vol. 29:83
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games do not.'0 0 In the normal form games, the players move simulta-
neously; whereas, the players move in a specified order in extensive
form games.10 1 An extensive form game has nodes from which arrows
or lines emanate. 10 2 These nodes are called decision nodes because
from each node the player, at that node, must make a decision.1 "3 The
lines or arrows from a given node represent a given player's strategies
at that location. 10 4 These games follow two general rules: (1) each
decision node must have at least one strategy coming from it; and (2)
beginning from an arbitrary decision node, one can never backtrack to
it; one must end up at the beginning of the game.10 5
Like the normal form game, an extensive form game also will have
a Nash equilibrium but the method of finding it differs. Extensive
form games are generally solved using backwards induction. 10 6 Essen-
tially this means that, instead of attempting to solve the game from the
beginning, one examines the game from the end and works her way
back to the beginning of the game. In this process one must ask what
are the best responses for each player given the best response of the
player who moves after her.10 7 For example:
Player 1
Right
Player 2
left right left right
Player l's payoffs: 5 0 1 10
Player 2's payoffs: 5 0 1 10
In this game, we can see that Player 2 will pick left if Player 1 picks Left
because her payoff of 5 is greater than 0 if she plays right. Likewise,
Player 2 will pick right if Player 1 picks Right because her payoff of 10
100. See KREPS, supra note 93, at 13.
101. See id. at 21.
102. See GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 117.
103. See id.
104. See KREPS, supra note 93, at 14.
105. See id. at 14.
106. See GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 57.
107. See id. at 60.
20061
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is greater than the payoff of I if she picks left. Knowing what Player 2
will do in either case, Player 1 will pick Right given it will bring him a
payoff of 10 (since Player 2 will also pick right) as opposed to the
payoff of 5 from playing Left. The Nash equilibrium in this game is
where Player 1 plays Right and Player 2 plays right.
In both of the game forms discussed above, there are two implicit
assumptions underlying the games. The first is that the players have
common knowledge.1 °8 This simply means "all the players are
rational, but also that all the players know that all the players are
rational, and that all the players know that all the players know that all
the players are rational, and so on, ad infinitum."'10 9 The second
assumption is that all players possess perfect information. 11 This
means "that at each move in the game the player with the moves knows
the full history of the play of the game thus far.""' The game theoretic
discussion that follows will further discuss the impact of each of the
implicit assumptions on the relevant games.
B. Rent-Seeking Games
While developed law and economics literature exists on eminent
domain, it does not apply to the analysis of this case. The literature
tends to discuss the role of compensation in eminent domain cases. 1 1 2
According to Thomas Miceli, the first formal analysis was done by
Lawrence Blume, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Perry Shapiro in 1984.1" The
initial analysis done by Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro focuses on the
role compensation plays upon property use incentives; they conclude
that no compensation results in the landowner making efficient invest-
ment decisions." 4 They also argue that if the government must pay
the full value of the property to that property owner, the government
will engage in an efficient amount of condemnations." 5 The problem
with the line of articles that follow this tradition is that compensation
108. See GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 7.
109. Id.
110. See GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 57.
111. Id. at 55.
112. See generally Lawrence Blume, Daniel Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of
Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 71-
92 (1984) [hereinafter Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, The Taking of the Land]; William
A. Fischel and Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on
Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
269-93 (1988); and THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW (1997).
113. See MICELI, supra note 112, at 139.
114. See id.
115. See generally, Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, The Taking of Land, supra note 112.
[Vol. 29:83
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is not an issue in this case. The issue here revolves around the incen-
tives created by this new lower level of judicial scrutiny. Therefore, one
must examine if the Kelo decision creates incentives for rent-seeking
behavior. This issue will be examined using a coordination game and
a game of incomplete information.
This section will first analyze what the relevant actors will do
given rent-seeking incentives. "Rent seeking was first discussed system-
atically by Gordon Tullock.""' 6 Typically, rent-seeking is applied to
circumstances where the government has created "artificial or con-
trived rents."' 1 7 Rent-seeking is a broad concept used to analyze the
behavior within families regarding rivalry for inheritance rights. It
also illustrates how, in certain labor markets, employees jockey for
position to get certain jobs."" Rent-seeking implies that resources will
be used to obtain the "artificial or contrived rents" created by govern-
ment." 9 Such an expenditure of resources is typically considered
wasteful and costly.
1. Coordination Game Approach
One can view rent-seeking as a coordination game.' 2 ° A coordina-
tion game occurs when "each player has the same number of actions,
which can be indexed so that it is a strict Nash equilibrium for the
players to play actions having the same index."' 1 An example of such
a game is the following:
Let there be two players (1,2) with two strategies (L,R). Let the
payoffs for (1) be aLR and for (2) bLR. In this game, aLL>aLR, aRR>aRL,
bLL>bRL, bRR> bLR. In normal form, the game is represented by:
116. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 229 (1989).
117. Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, 506, 508
(Dennis C. Muller ed., 1997).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Jose Casas-Pardo & Juan D. Montoro-Pons, On Norms and Coordination
Games: A Rent-Seeking Approach, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 237 (2001).
121. H. PEYTON YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 40 (1998).
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Player 2
L R
Player 1
L
R
[Vol. 29:83
The coordination game used in this analysis will make several
assumptions. The first assumption is that there are no hold-out
problems. 122 The second assumption is that local governments prefer
developers to privately purchase property as opposed to condemning
property. 123 The third assumption is property costs less in a condem-
nation action as opposed to a private sale even if the developer fully
compensates the government for the taking. 124 The final assumption
is that the private developer incurs no cost to ask for condemnation.
In this game, both a private developer and the local government
want to invest in an area of a city and help economically develop the
area. The developer and the local government possess a well-inte-
grated plan for economic development. The only issue facing them is
how to acquire the property necessary to act upon their plan.
122. This is in line with the facts of Kelo as stated in O'Connor's dissent. Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. This is because while economic development probably will help politicians
earn more votes due to concentrated benefits, it will also cost them votes due to the
harm imposed on landowners of condemned property and the dispersed cost of
higher taxes to pay compensation for the taking.
124. The rationale behind this assumption is based on behavioral law and
economics literature. If the homeowners suffer from the endowment effect, they value
their property more than the market because they own it. From this, it naturally
follows that fair market value will always be less than the amount they would be
willing to accept. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMIcs 211, 213 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2001).
aLL, bLL aLR, bLR
aRi, bRL aRR, bRR
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Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Suppose there
are two players: Developer and Government. They each have two strat-
egies. Developer can obtain property through a private transaction or
she can rent-seek and ask for condemnation. Government can deny
condemnation or it can grant condemnation. Developer obtains posi-
tive utility if she can correctly coordinate with Government and vice
versa.
If Developer uses a private contract, she receives positive utility if
Government denies condemnation because she will obtain the land,
albeit at a higher price than if it were condemned; Government will
receive positive utility as well because it will not have embarrassed
itself by granting condemnation when it was unnecessary. If Devel-
oper uses a private contract and Government grants condemnation
then, again, she receives positive utility because she will obtain the
land, albeit at a higher price; Government will receive a lower level of
utility because it will have embarrassed itself by condemning property
when there was no hold-out problem. However, that embarrassment is
tempered by the payoff of future development. If Developer seeks con-
demnation and Government does not grant it, she receives negative
utility since she will not get the land; likewise, Government receives
negative utility because it could have spurred economic development
and failed to do so. If Developer seeks condemnation and Government
grants it, she receives positive utility and obtains the land at a lower
price; likewise, Government receives positive utility because it spurred
economic development.
The game will have the following structure in normal form:
Government
Deny Grant
Developer
Private
Contract
Seek
Condemnation
B, A B, C
-A, -A A, B
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In this game, the payoffs A, B, and C are positive integers; A being
greater than B, B being greater than C. As one can see from the game,
there are three Nash equilibria, including two pure Nash equilibria at
(Private Contract, Deny) and (Seek Condemnation, Grant). To deter-
mine which Nash equilibrium will most likely be the outcome in this
case, one will need to determine which outcome is a focal point.
125
Michael Chwe offers the following perspective: "[tjo understand
how people solve coordination problems, we should thus look at social
processes that generate common knowledge" because this will help the
players find the focal point. 126 Chwe argues that generating common
knowledge involves some sort of communication; however, even
"[s]uccessful communication sometimes is not simply a matter of
whether a given message is received. It also depends on whether peo-
ple are aware that other people also received it."'1 27 He argues common
knowledge-generating mechanisms may be a ritual or a ceremony.
128
Chwe also argues that advertisements may help generate common
knowledge and that using strong links to disseminate information also
help generate common knowledge. 129
Kaushik Basu's work also supports this analysis. Basu argues, "in
a nation with the reputation for laws being implemented effectively, a
new law can quickly become effective.' 130 Once a new law becomes
effective, it "influenc[es] beliefs and creat[es] focal points . . . [and]
direct[s] society to some existing equilibrium."'1 3 1
The Kelo result has been publicized on national television and has
been the topic of debate in the media since the Court announced its
decision. Arguably, the decision has received as much public media
attention as some product commercials. In addition, because Kelo was
a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the Connecticut
Supreme Court, one may infer credible implementation of this deci-
sion by the government. Given the publicity and implementation by
the government, it follows that sufficient common knowledge has been
125. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (1980). Schelling
argues that "[mlost situations-perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at
this kind of game-provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for
each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to
do." Id.
126. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL 3 (2001).
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 23-7.
129. Id. at 37.
130. KAUSHIK BASU, PRELUDE TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 124 (2000).
131. Id. at 120.
[Vol. 29:83
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generated such that a focal point in the (Seek Condemnation, Grant)
outcome may exist.
Given the likely focal equilibrium, one should expect the Kelo
decision to result in an increase in the number of takings for economic
development purposes. In addition, developers will have an increased
incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior to obtain the property at a
lower price because this will allow them to bypass the higher price
(created by the endowment effect) of purchasing the property through
private contract.
2. Game of Incomplete Information Approach
While the coordination game may tease out the general effects of
the Kelo decision, a more realistic approach may be to analyze the fac-
tual scenario as a game of incomplete information. This is so because
developers may not necessarily know what type of local government
they will be playing against. In this game, developers do not know
whether the local government is predisposed to condemning property
post-Kelo or whether they are predisposed to refuse condemnation as a
backlash to the Kelo decision.
This analysis will make several assumptions. The first assump-
tion is that there are no hold-out problems. The second assumption is
that developers do not know what type of government they are playing
against; nature will make that determination based on a probability
distribution between zero and one.132 The third assumption is that
local governments prefer developers to privately purchase property as
opposed to resorting to condemning property.133 The fourth assump-
tion is property costs less in a condemnation action as opposed to a
private sale even if the developer fully compensates the government for
the taking. The final assumption is that the firm incurs no cost to ask
for condemnation.
The players in this game are: Nature, Developer, and Government.
In this game, Nature will move first. Nature will pick, based on a
probability distribution, between zero (0) and one (1), what type of
Government the Developer will play against. Nature can pick a Gov-
ernment who is not predisposed to condemning property or it can
pick a Government who is predisposed to condemning property. After
132. In these types of models, the probabilistic move made by nature is used to
"capture the idea that ... [Developer] is uncertain about the characteristics of...
[Government]." DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 464 (1990). In
games of incomplete information, nature selects which type of Government Developer
must play against. Id.
133. KREPS, supra note 93, at 13.
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Nature moves, Developer moves and does not know what type of Gov-
ernment she is playing against. Developer can either purchase prop-
erty via a private contract or she can rent-seek and ask for a property
transfer via condemnation; if Developer picks to purchase property via
a private contract, the game ends. If Developer chooses to rent-seek,
Government will pick between refusing to condemn or condemning
property.
Summarizing the payoffs:
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government refuses, she gets zero,
regardless of what type of Government she is playing against
because she does not receive the property.
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government condemns the property,
she earns a higher payoff than if she privately contracted, in both
cases, because it costs less than engaging in a private contract.
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government refuses to condemn, the
non--predisposed Government receives a high payoff because it sup-
ported its belief in defending private property.
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government refuses to condemn, the
predisposed Government receives a payoff of zero because they
would have preferred to condemn the land given the opportunity
but failed to do so.
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government condemns, the non-predis-
posed Government will earn a negative payoff because they violated
their belief in protecting private property and their voters will pun-
ish them in the next election cycle.
* If Developer rent-seeks and Government condemns, the predisposed
Government earns a positive payoff but it is smaller than if Devel-
oper had privately contracted because condemning may probabilisti-
cally cost it votes in the next election cycle.
In extensive form, the game is as follows:
[Vol. 29:83
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Nature
(P)
Not Predisposed
(1-[L) Developer
Government
Grant
0 A 0
A -A 0
Private
Contract
In the game, payoffs A and B are positive intergers where A is
greater than B and Developer's payoffs are listed above Government's
payoffs. To solve this game, one must find the probability of what type
of Government Developer is playing against and Developer's belief of
what type of Government she is playing against. Based on this belief,
Developer will engage in a private contract or will rent-seek. To solve
this, the weak perfect Baysian equilibrium (WPBE) must be found.
This can be found by equating Developer's expected utility for playing
private contract and her expected utility of rent-seeking and solving for
the probability of playing against a non-predisposed Government.
Developer's expected utility of using a private contract is:
EUpvate'=P(B)+(1-P)B (Equation 1)
Developer's expected utility of rent-seeking is:
EURe tseeki.g=P(O)+( 1-P)A
Setting them equal to each other:
P(B)+(1-P)B=P(0)+(1-P)A
(Equation 2)
(Equation 3)
Solving for P gives:
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A
(Equation 4)
The WPBE stated formally is
Private Contract with beliefs
P> 1- -,
A
B
1>l- -.
A
This means Developer will privately contract for the property using the
market if she believes that the probability of getting a Government that
is not predisposed to condemning property is greater than or equal to
B
A
However, if she believes
she will rent-seek. The Kelo decision may have increased the amount
of rent-seeking engaged in by Developer because the Court, in its deci-
sion to expand the public use standard, effectively reduced P. This
reduction in P occurs because more governments may be willing to
condemn land for economic development given they know that their
condemnation will be held to have no constitutional infirmity.
The result of the game of incomplete information is developers
will engage in private contracts if they sufficiently believe they will face
a government that is not predisposed to condemning private property.
However, if their belief is weak, then it would be optimal for developers
to rent-seek and ask the government to condemn the property and
transfer it to them because of the increased likelihood of playing
against a government predisposed to condemning property."' The
decision in Kelo, by legitimizing this kind of taking, may have reduced
134. The actual probability value depends on the actual payoffs received by the
players. This will depend on empirical data.
[Vol. 29:83
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the probability of a local government not being predisposed to con-
demn. This would then result in an increase in rent-seeking by devel-
opers and condemnations by local governments.
C. Federalism Signaling Game
The majority opinion, almost as an afterthought, argued that if
people find the expanded Constitution baseline too low, nothing pre-
vents them from seeking higher protection from their state constitu-
tion.'3 ' While Justice O'Connor finds this part of the majority
decision as "an abdication of [the Court's] responsibility[,]" it has the
potential to salvage the opinion. 136 While the Court places the burden
of higher protection on the states, it also allows the states to rectify a
federal mistake. The blessing of dual sovereignty may save property
owners in America from the majority opinion. In essence, Justice Ste-
vens sets up a game where states can signal their level of property
rights protection and allow Tiebout voting, i.e., voting with your feet, to
operate. 1
3 7
If one assumes that immediately after Kelo all the states begin
with the same baseline of property protection, some states may find it
in their interests to separate themselves from the pooling outcome. To
accomplish this, the states will need some sort of mechanism that cre-
ates a separating equilibrium.'13  A commitment to protect property
rights exceeding the Federal Constitution baseline may be one way to
generate such an outcome.
The states will play a signaling game that establishes a separating
equilibrium. In this game, residents and developers are attempting to
discern the type of state in which they live. 139 In order for a signal to
create a separating equilibrium, the signal must be sufficiently costly
for one class of players as compared to another class; this way only one
135. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
136. Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2668 (majority opinion).
138. A separating equilibrium occurs where there are two types of players in a game
and one type is able to send a signal to distinguish it from the other type of player in
the game. In games that involve this type of equilibrium, the result of the game allows
for successful sorting between the two types of players. See ANDREU MAs-COLELL,
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 455 (1995).
139. One should note that if this game is successful, the previous game of
incomplete information becomes moot because developers will be able to discern who
they are playing against based on an observable signal.
20061
21
Yonai: Kelo and the Games People Play: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Kelo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
type of player is capable of sending the signal and observers can sepa-
rate them from the others. 1 40
In this game, assume there are two types of players: a high type
(H) and a low type (L). 41 Both players receive positive utility through
the number of votes (V) they receive. 142 However, both players incur
some cost in implementing stricter eminent domain laws because they
will restrict the government's ability to make policy and reduce their
overall power. In this game, high types bear a lower cost of protecting
property rights because they are committed to that ideal and are will-
ing to limit a power they seldom use. Low types bear a larger cost
because they would prefer to condemn property. The game will take
the form of:
Votes UL(V) UH(V)
V L - - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - --
V* -
P* P Property Rights Protection
In this game assume the level of P and V for all states begins at P*
and V* when Kelo is decided. At this point, all the states are pooled
together in a pooling equilibrium. 143 High-type states do not want to
140. ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NORMS 19 (2000). In other words, to maintain
a stable separating equilibrium, it must be too expensive for one type to engage in the
signaling behavior. GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 194 (1992).
141. A high type of player corresponds to a state that wants to protect private
property. A low type of player corresponds to a state that wants to condemn property
for the sake of economic development.
142. This can be viewed as public support for the state and/or politicians.
143. A pooling equilibrium is a state where both types find it best to send the same
signal and the low types can trick the other player into thinking it is a high type.
GIBBONS, supra note 97, at 198-99.
[Vol. 29:83
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be associated with low-type states after the Kelo decision and the vot-
ing public is willing to provide Vpubl1i votes to states providing at least 15
level of protection. Under these conditions, since VPUbic>VH and Vpubzk-
C[ H,f] >VH-C[ H,I5 ] the bigh-type states will protect private property
and create "anti-Kelo" -laws to prohibit these kinds of takings because
doing so provides more utility than high-type states are willing to
accept at P.144 However, because VpubhLC<VL and V*-C[L,P*]>Vubic-
C[L,15], low type states will not enact such measures. This is so
because the amount of extra votes they receive for increasing property
rights protection costs those states less than implementing the new
law. This demonstrates how one may witness a separating equilib-
rium emerge from this decision where some states will enforce a
stricter standard than Kelo and others will make use of the low stan-
dard set by the Court in Kelo to facilitate rent-seeking and thus signal
their type by maintaining the status quo.
1 4 5
D. Tiebout and Voting with the Feet
Given this result, does the Tiebout model apply? The Tiebout
model suggests that one should see rational people move from states
that provide a "less attractive public goods-tax package in favor of
those providing more attractive packages. ' 146 "[Niumerous studies
have found that both the levels of public services and tax rates influ-
ence whether a family moves."'1 47 Other studies have demonstrated
that the elderly tended to move from high income tax states to no
income tax states.'14  In this case, low-type states will tend to have
higher taxes to pay for the increased number of takings; in addition,
one can view the increased probability of property condemnation as a
tax on land given the property right of ownership is more tenuous and
less valuable.
Relative to low-type states, high-type states should appear to offer
lower taxes because the increased difficulty in condemning land will
144. In each inequality, what is being compared is the marginal benefit of providing
more protection versus the marginal benefit of only providing the amount of protection
each type is predisposed to provide. In the previous equations, the C function
represents the cost to high type states of providing f5 level of protection. The same
notation will be used to discuss the low type states' choices in this game and their cost
function.
145. This result only holds if the amount of the voting public willing to support
politicians or governments who protect property is characterized by: VH=Vp,.b1k<VL.
146. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 199 (Cambridge University Press 2003).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Richard J. Cebula, A Brief Empirical Note on Tiebout Hypothesis and
State Income Tax Policies, 67 PUBLIC CHOICE 87-89 (1990).
2006] 105
23
Yonai: Kelo and the Games People Play: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Kelo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
reduce the need to raise revenue to compensate property owners. 14 9
These effects would tend to provide an incentive for people to move
from low-type states to high-type states. This would result in an over-
all lower tax base for low-type states. In this way, competition for taxes
and population may induce states to increase their respective stan-
dards of scrutiny. Thus, federalism works to protect Americans where
the Court failed to do so in the Kelo decision.
On the other hand, while property is more tenuous and taxes may
be higher, the increased economic development may offset any outflow
of people. Since increased development should create jobs, the area
may become more attractive to new potential residents. With the
increase in economic development, better infrastructure and public
services may exist in the development zone. These enhancements and
increases in public services would tend to attract people to move to the
area in spite of the lower standard of property protection.
The major problem with applying the Tiebout model to the Kelo
decision is that the increased fragility of property rights may not be
sufficient to cause people to move from low type states to high type
states. The problem with moving (and by default leaving your real
property) is that it defeats the purpose of retaining your real property
interest. In addition, using a cost-benefit analysis, it is not clear that
moving to obtain better property rights protection makes sense. The
only way leaving a low type state makes sense is if the expected cost of
losing your home is greater than the cost of packing, moving, finding a
new job, enrolling your children in a new school, and all the other
social costs of leaving a state. The expected cost of losing your home
is the difference between what you are willing to accept to sell your
house versus what the government determines is the fair market value
multiplied by the probability of actually losing your home.
Hypothetically, if that difference is $100,000 and the probability
of you losing your home is estimated at 0.04 percent, then the
expected cost of losing your home is $40.150 However, the costs of
packing, moving, finding a new job, enrolling your children in a new
149. This of course assumes two states beginning with equal tax rates prior to Kelo
and assumes post-Kelo that taxes only change to pay compensation.
150. The probability of losing one's home is estimated from the number of
petitioners in the Kelo case divided by the total population of New London,
Connecticut. Given that these nine people did not want to sell, they are a proxy for
those who would not accept the government money and would be forced to lose their
home against their will. Therefore, dividing that number by the total population of the
city provides a rough estimate of the probability of coercively losing one's house in
that city. City of New London, Connecticut - Demographics, http://ci.new-london.ct.
us/content/29/71/default.aspx (last visited Sep. 18, 2006).
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school, and all the other social costs of leaving a state are probably
greater than $40. It does not make economic sense to move to a
greater protection state. Therefore, one should only expect a few idio-
syncratic individuals to move from low protection states to high protec-
tion states.
Abandoning one's home seems like an exceptionally costly way to
protect property. Since economic development provides collateral ben-
efits, it thereby enhances the public good and possibly overrides any
exit movement. In fact, one may actually expect to see an influx of
new residents. Given this result, the likelihood of Tiebout voting with
one's feet on the property rights protection margin is small at best. The
signal sent by the states may only be a token signal or sign of good will
as opposed to one meant to be acted upon by property owners.
This would result in the inability of federalism to create an alter-
native solution to the Court's opinion. States may not reconsider
increasing scrutiny if people are not likely to move away from a low
type state. For those states, there is little cost to maintain their policy
since people are not likely to leave and more people are moving to that
state. Given the expected results under the Tiebout model, the argu-
ment that federalism may provide an exit from the Kelo decision may
merely be an illusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Kelo will change the behavior of real
estate developers and local governments. The Kelo decision will create
an environment where developers will have an incentive to engage in
more rent-seeking and where local governments will be able to con-
demn property for economic development with the blessing of the
Court. In response, some states will attempt to signal to Americans
that they do not stand with the Court on the Kelo decision; they will
increase their level of scrutiny and make condemnation for economic
development purposes illegal. However, it is not clear under the Tie-
bout model whether people will move from low type states to high type
states to create a situation where all states have a competitive incentive
to increase their scrutiny from the federal baseline. In fact, it appears
that more people may move to a low type state than leave it. If this
result is accurate, then federalism may not protect American property
owners when the United States Supreme Court failed to do so in Kelo.
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